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NOTES AND  COMMENTS 
SOCIAL  STABILITY  AND EQUILIBRIUM 
BY ITZHAK  GILBOA  AND  AKIHIKO  MATSUI  1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
IN  THE  FIELD  OF  NONCOOPERATIVE GAME THEORY,  Nash  equilibrium (Nash (1951))  has 
played a central role as a solution concept.  In bold strokes, one may discern two major 
interpretations of Nash equilibrium in the context of rational players. 
The first, which is close to the "eductive" interpretation of Binmore (1987, 1988) and 
the  "complete  information" interpretation of Kaneko (1987), assumes that the game is 
played exactly once (if it is a repeated game, the repetition occurs once), and the players 
have  sufficient  knowledge  and  ability  to  analyze  the  game  in  a  rational  manner. 
Sometimes it is assumed that all players have consistent hierarchies of beliefs, where the 
game and their priors are common knowledge. Bayesian interpretation such as proposed 
by Aumann (1987) advanced this idea to the level that the players have a common prior. 
From this point  of view, however, Nash  equilibrium seems  far from being  satisfactory 
as it  does  not  satisfy some  requirements  of  "strategic stability."2 Thus,  many studies 
have been  made to refine the concept; among them are Selten  (1975), Myerson (1978), 
Kalai  and  Samet  (1984),  and  Kohlberg  and  Mertens  (1986).  Some  studies  (see,  e.g., 
Brandenburger and Dekel  (1987)) loosen  the  requirement of  common  knowledge,  but 
still require some  a priori  knowledge. 
The  second  interpretation is sometimes  referred to  as the  "evolutive" (Binmore) or 
"naive" interpretation (Kaneko). It does not require that participants in the game know 
its  structure or  other  facts  at  the  outset.  According  to  this  interpretation,  a  similar 
situation  is  repeated  many times,  and people  use  trials and errors in choosing  better 
strategies  on  the  basis  of  information  they  gradually acquire.  A  Nash  equilibrium is 
considered as a stationary point in this repeated situation. 
At  this  point,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  price  theory  of  an  earlier  age  such  as 
Walrasian economics shares the basic view of the world with the naive interpretation. It 
assumes rational participants in the economy but does  not assume any common knowl- 
edge among participants. They do not know and do not have to know the entire structure 
of  the  economy; rather, they observe aggregated signals such as prices on  the basis of 
which they determine their behavior. 
This "naive" price theory has solved many economic problems under some appropri- 
ate assumptions on the market structure. For example, in a perfect competition  model, 
the  assumption  of  price-takers  results  in  that  the  participants  have  (usually  unique) 
dominant strategies  as a function  of  the  price signal. The  purpose  of  this paper is  to 
apply similar analysis to general n-person normal-form games. In our model, we assume 
a  large  population  out  of  which  individual players  are  randomly matched  to  play  a 
one-shot normal-form game; hence each one of them may consider oneself a "price-taker" 
and ignore one's effect on others' behavior. 
In  price  theory  and  game  theory  alike,  there  is  interest  in  the  stability  of  an 
equilibrium, and more generally, in the dynamics of processes which may or may not lead 
to  an equilibrium. However, in our interpretation of  a game, this question  seems  even 
1 The authors wish to thank the participants of a seminar at Northwestern University as well as 
Professors Ehud Kalai, Andreu  Mas-Colell, Kiminori Matsuyama, Robert Weber,  two anonymous 
referees,  and especially Dov Monderer for many useful comments and references. The first author 
gratefully acknowledges partial support from NSF Grant No. IRI-8814672. 
2 See the discussion in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). 
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more  relevant and unavoidable  than in price  theory since  Nash  equilibrium in mixed 
strategies typically involves nonunique  best  responses.  To  support Nash  equilibrium in 
our interpretation we  have to assume that a certain portion of  the population  chooses 
each specific strategy, while all the population  is indifferent among several of them. In 
other words, even  if all players are perfectly rational and the population  is at equilib- 
rium, there is no compelling reason to believe  it would stay there. There are equally or 
more probable scenarios according to which every individual plays optimally and yet the 
behavior pattern moves away from the equilibrium point. 
In defining a solution concept on the basis of the naive interpretation, we require it to 
satisfy the following four qualifications. First, as in a perfectly competitive market, it is 
assumed that each player is sufficiently small and anonymous, and then may maximize 
his/her  expected  utility without getting involved in complicated strategic considerations 
such  as  retaliation.  Second,  unlike  a  deviation  made  by a  single  player, a  change  in 
behavior pattern  is  made  in  a  continuous  way. This  expresses  the  intuitive  idea  that 
within a small time interval only a correspondingly small proportion of  the individuals 
realize the current behavior pattern and change their strategies. Thirdly, individuals are 
myopic  and  choose  best  response  strategies  to  the  current  behavior  pattern.  The 
important consequence  of this assumption is that the behavior pattern may form a cycle. 
Finally, there is a certain limitation in recognizing the current situation. No matter how 
much information one gathers, it is hard to tell the exact behavior pattern of the society 
at a given moment. 
Similarly to the case of complete  information, the concept of Nash equilibrium is not 
satisfactory as a solution concept when we take the above features  into consideration.3 
For example, in the game of coordination, which is shown in Figure 1, there are three 
Nash  equilibria,  namely,  ([L], [L]), ([R], [R]),  and  (2[L]  +  '[R],  '[LI  +  '[R]).  In  the 
"real world," if  the  behavior pattern  fluctuates  toward, say, ([L],[L])  from the  third 
equilibrium,  and  if  that  tendency  is  observed,  then  people  are  likely  to  follow  that 
behavior. Therefore, the mixed strategy equilibrium of this example is unlikely to sustain 
itself  as a stationary point  of  some  dynamic process.  We will propose  a new  solution 
concept,  called "cyclically stable set," to capture these intuitive ideas, and extend them 
beyond the mere classification of Nash equilibria to stable and unstable ones. 
We first consider the following notion of accessibility, the precise definition of which 
will be given in the following section: given E > 0, a strategy profile g is e-accessible from 
f  if there is a continuous path starting with f  and ending in g, such that the direction at 
each point of the path is a best response to some strategy in the c-neighborhood of that 
point; a strategy profile g  is accessible from f  if there exists a g' sufficiently close  to g 
and E sufficiently close to zero such that g' is c-accessible from f.  A cyclically stable set 
(CSS) is a set of strategy profiles such that no strategy profile outside the set is accessible 
from  any  strategy profile  inside  the  set,  and  all  the  strategy profiles  in  the  set  are 
accessible from each other. In particular, if the cyclically stable set is a singleton, we call 
3 The refined concepts in the context of strategic stability can also be viewed as refinements on 
the basis of  the  "naive" or "evolutive" interpretation, in which case  they have similar defects  to 
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its element a socially  stable strategy.  We will prove  that cyclically  stable sets always  exist 
and that each one of  them is closed and connected. This new, set-valued solution 
concept is quite different  from various  refinements  of Nash equilibrium,  such as trem- 
bling hand perfect  (Selten (1975)),  persistent  (Kalai  and Samet  (1984)),  proper  (Myerson 
(1979)), evolutionary  stable strategy  (Maynard  Smith and Price (1973)), and stable set 
(Kohlberg  and Mertens (1986)). It also differs from the notion of fictitious  play (e.g., 
Shapley  (1964)).  For a more detailed  discussion,  see Gilboa and Matsui  (1989). 
One important  feature of CSS's is the independence of sequential elimination  of 
strictly  dominated  strategies.  The situation  we have in mind  is that all the individuals  are 
so "small"  that they do not have  to consider  the effect of their  choices  on the distribution 
of the population,  and that all the individuals  make no mistakes  except that they cannot 
recognize  the present situation  precisely  (even in that case, their choices are made in a 
rational  manner  on the basis of their observation.)  In this situation  no one should care 
about strictly  dominated  strategies,  which  cannot  be chosen at a stationary  state. On the 
other hand,  weakly  dominated  strategy  may  be present  in the support  of strategy  profiles 
in a CSS since an individual  does not care or does not even know the payoff  difference 
that appears  only when other types of individuals  take strategies  which are not used. 
Note  that Selten's concept of  trembling hand perfectness and Kalai and Samet's 
persistent equilibrium  are affected by strictly dominated strategies (see examples in 
Gilboa and Matsui  (1989)). 
Another important property is  independence of  redundant strategies. Note  that 
Myerson's  proper equilibrium  does not satisfy  this property  (see an example  in Gilboa 
and Matsui  (1989)). 
Our model and solution concept are general enough to deal with various random- 
matching  processes. Consider  for simplicity  a game in which two people are matched. 
Then the following  two cases are distinguished.  In the first,  the two people matched  are 
from  different  groups  of individuals,  say, male and female. In the second, they belong to 
the same type. In  n-person games, in which there are exactly n  participants,  this 
distinction  does not bother  us since each person  is assumed  to have  his/her own identity; 
on the other hand, in n-type games, which typically  involve  many participants  of each 
type, information  is gathered about types, while the decision makers are individuals. 
Hence, should  two individuals  of the same type be matched,  each may choose a strategy 
independently  of the other, but the aggregate  strategy  profile  has to be symmetric. 
We allow  the model to cope with both situations.  Our results  are stated and proved  in 
a general  framework  in which a "game"  involves  the encounter  of several  (possibly  one) 
individuals  of  each type. The cyclically  stable sets will, of  course, depend on  the 
assumptions  regarding  the identity  of types of different  players  (see Gilboa and Matsui 
(1989)). 
The rest of this paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  2 presents  some definitions  and 
notations.  Section 3 defines the new solution  concept which captures  the idea of social 
stability. In Section 4 we prove its existence and discuss some of its properties. In 
particular,  it is shown  that any socially  stable  strategy,  which  is defined  as the element of 
a CSS if the latter is  a singleton, is a Nash equilibrium  and that any strict Nash 
equilibrium  is a socially  stable strategy.  We also give an example  of a game  which  has no 
intersection  between the set of Nash equilibria  and the union of all cyclically  stable sets. 
2.  DEFINITIONS  AND  NOTATIONS 
In a society, equivalently-a  "game,"  there are several types of individuals.  Some 
people are matched randomly  to take some actions. In each matching  situation, the 
number  of participants  from  each type is fixed and may exceed one. Therefore,  depend- 
ing on the setting,  two individuals  of the same type may  be matched. 
Formally,  a game G is described  by a quadruple: 
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where I=  {1, 2,...,  n} is the set of types of individuals,  Si(i E I)  is the finite set of 
strategies for  each  individual of  type  i, M = (ml, M2,  .. .,  Mn)  specifies the  num- 
ber of  individuals  of  each type who are matched in each matching situation, and 
T:  XJ ( I Sjm() x  Si -9  where  mi(i)  = mi - 1  and  mj(i) = mj  if  i  ]  i  is  a  payoff 
function for each individual  of type i, where a typical  value wri(si,  ...  , sm'  ,..,si,.  .. 
Si  -1  smn;  Si)  is  the payoff  for individual  of type i when he/she takes si, while  others 
take (si,.,  Sn  Mn).  This somewhat  awkward  definition  of the domain  will simplify  nota- 
tions in the sequel. We assume that Tri  is invariant  with respect to permutation  of 
strategies  among  the same type, i.e., among sJ,..., 5  sTJ(i)  We bear in mind the interpre- 
tation according  to which  each i E I consists  of a sufficiently  large  number  of individuals 
who are anonymous  and are matched  randomly  in each instance;  without  this interpreta- 
tion, the definitions  in the following  sections  will have  little validity.  Let F1  A(Si)  be the 
set of probability  distributions  over Si, i.e., 
Fi  A(Si) = (f:  S-  f  fi(s)  = 1,  and  fi(si)  > O for  all s, E St}. 
siesl 
We may call F  x,1 I z(Si)  the class of  strategy  profiles and f  (fl,. . . , fn)  F  a 
strategy  profile. In considering  the dynamic  adjustment  process, the current strategy 
profile  will often be referred  to as a behavior  pattern.  F is considered  as (E' ,IS  I  -  n- 
dimensional  space on which Euclidean norm, 11  11,  and linear operations are defined. 
Given a strategy  profile f E F, the expected  payoff  for an individual  of type i (i E I) if 
he/she  takes a strategy r, E Si is: 
Mni) 
Hi(f;  rz) =  f  rI  fri(s1k)T1(s;  ri). 
sE  xJE1Sj  ,(1)  jiI  k=1 
Let Bri(f)  be the set of pure strategies  for individuals  of type i E I  that are best 
responses  to f,  i.e., 
Bri(f)  =  argmax  rI (f;  ri). 
r, E- S,i 
Given G c F, we denote  Bri(G)-  Ug  E GBrl(g). 
Let a function  [ ]: Si -A(Si)  (i E I)  satisfy  [s,](s1)  = 1 for all s  E  S,. The e-neighbor- 
hood of a strategy  profile f,  denoted by U,(f),  is the set of strategy  profiles g  the 
distance  of which  from f  in the Euclidean  norm  is less than e. 
3.  SOCIAL  STABILITY  AND  CYCLICALLY  STABLE  SETS 
This section defines and discusses  the concepts  of social and cyclical  stability.  First  of 
all, the definition  of Nash equilibrium  is given. 
DEFINITION:  A strategy  profile  f * E X,  A(Si) is a Nash equilibrium  if f*  is a best 
response  to f*  itself. 
To capture  the idea of social  stability,  we consider  the following  three points:  (1) there 
are no strategic  considerations  such as retaliation;  (2) unlike  a deviation  made  by a single 
player, a change in behavior  pattern is likely to be continuous;  and (3) each player's 
ability  to recognize  the current  situation  is limited.  To express  these points,  we introduce 
the notion of e-accessibility. SOCIAL  STABILITY  AND  EQUILIBRIUM  863 
DEFINITION:  Given  E > 0 and strategy profiles  f  and  g,  g  is  e-accessible from  f  if 
there exist a continuous function  p:  [0, 1] --  F  differentiable from the right, a function 
h: [0, 1] -*  F  continuous from the right, and a  EC [0,  mo)  such that 
p(0)  =f,  p(1)=  g, 
and for each  t E [0, 1) 
(d+/dt)p(t)  = a(h(t)  -p(t)),  and 
h(t)  E- xl,  {ABrj[ UE(P(  t))]}. 
The definition says that in case of a >  0, a behavior pattern moves in the direction of a 
convex  combination  of  best  responses  to  some  strategy  profiles  which  are  in  the 
e-neighborhood  of  the  behavior  pattern,  and  it  stays  at  the  same  place  only  if  the 
behavior pattern is a best  response  to  another one  which is in the  8-neighborhood  of 
itself.  By  including  the  case  of  a = 0,  we  assure  that  a  strategy  profile  is  always 
e-accessible  from itself. 
The interpretation of this definition is that only small and equal portions of individuals 
in each  type realize  the current behavior pattern and change their behavior pattern to 
another which is a best response to it. In doing so, there is a limitation on the ability of 
recognizing the current behavior pattern, so that its change may not be directed toward a 
best response  to it; rather, it is only assumed that the direction is a best response  to a 
possibly different behavior pattern which is in the  8-neighborhood of  the current one. 
We  may call the function  p  an  8-accessible  path from  f  to  g.  Using  this, accessibility 
from one strategy profile to another is defined. 
DEFINITION:  For two strategy profiles f  and  g,  g  is  accessible from  f  if there exist 
sequences  {8e, =1  in (0, +X  o)  and {gn}Zt1=  in F  convergent to 0 and g  respectively such 
that g'  is en-accessible from  f  for all n. 
Now, we are in a position to present the definition of cyclical stability. 
DEFINITION:  A  nonempty subset  F*  of  xi ,, I(Sj)  is  cyclically stable if no  g 0 F*  is 
accessible from any f E F*,  and eveiy f * in F*  is accessible from all f  in F*. 
A  strategy profile f * E xl  I A(Sj) is called  a  socially stable strategy (SSS)  if {f *}  is 
cyclically stable. 
A cyclically stable set (CSS) is stable in the sense that once the actual behavior pattern 
falls into it, another strategy profile may be realized if and only if it is within the  CSS. 
The interpretation of this concept is as follows: For a long time, individuals have sought 
better  strategies.  After  they  search  all  the  alternatives  and  acquire  almost  complete 
knowledge about the behavior pattern of other individuals, the actual behavior pattern 
may move within a CSS but never leave it. The  term "cyclically stable" stems from the 
intuitive notion  of cycles within the CSS. However,  the paths may, of course, be much 
more complicated,  especially when  there  are tie  situations, in which case  the behavior 
pattern may fluctuate arbitrarily along a continuum of strategy profiles. 
Before we present the properties of CSS's, we present some important properties of 
the notion of accessibility, which are summarized in the following two lemmata. 
LEMMA  1: Suppose that  {gfln=1  is  a  sequence of  strategy profiles all  of  which are 
accessible from f E F.  If g" converges to g E F,  then g is accessible from f. 864  ITZHAK  GILBOA  AND  AKIHIKO  MATSUI 
PROOF: Let there be  given {gfnl}  1,  f,  and  g  as above. For each  gfn,  there  exists a 
sequence  (gnk)  such that  gnk  is in the  1/k-neighborhood  of  gn  and is 1/k-accessible 
from f.  Take the diagonal sequence  (Ak)  =  (gkk).  Then  (pUk)  converges to  g  and  ,  iS 
1/k-accessible  from f. Thus, g is accessible from f.  Q.E.D. 
LEMMA  2:  If g is accessible  from g which is accessible from f,  then g is accessible  from f. 
PROOF: Suppose  that  g  is accessible  from  g  and that  g  is accessible  from f.  Then 
there  exists  a  sequence  (gn)  converging to  g  such  that  gf  is  1/n-accessible  from f. 
Given 8 >  0, there exists n such that gn  E  U^,(g) for all n >  n. Since g is accessible from 
g,  there exists a 8-accessible  path from  g  to  g'  E U,(g),  denoted  by p.  We construct a 
28-accessible  path  from  gn  to  g" E U2,(g),  denoted  by  q,  by using  p.  Since  p  is  a 
8-accessible path from g  to g', p  is a solution to the problem: 
(d+/dt)p  = a0(oh  -p),  p(O)  = g, 
for  some  a0 > 0  and  a  function  ho  continuous  from  the  right on  [0,1].  Since  ho  is 
continuous  from the  right, it  has  no  more  than  a  countable  number of  discontinuity 
points (see  Gilboa and Matsui for a proof). Consider the problem: find a continuous  q 
such that 
(d+/dt)q  = ao(ho  -  q)  with  q(0)  = gn. 
By a well known theorem (see, e.g., Coddington and Levinson (1955, pp. 75-78)),  such a 
q exists and is unique. Moreover, since ho is continuous from the right, (d+/dt)q  equals 
ao(ho -  q) even at the discontinuity points of ho. 
Now, since IIp(O)  -  q(0)II <8  holds, and p  is a 8-accessible path, it is sufficient to show 
that  Ip  p(t) -  q(t)JI  is nonincreasing in  t. If  a0 = 0 the  claim trivially holds,  so  suppose 
a0 > 0. First, we have 
(d +/dt)( p -  q) = axo(ho  -p)  -ao(ho  -q)  = -ao(p p-q). 
Then we have 
1p(t + r)  -  q(t +?r) || <  ||{p(t)  -  q(t)}  + (d+/dt)(p(t)  -  q(t))r  || + o(r) 
= 1J(i  -  aor){p(t)  -  q(t)}  JJ  + o(r), 
which  is  smaller  than  Ilp(t) -  q(t)lI  for  sufficiently  small  7  >  0.  Thus,  there  exists 
g"  E U2,(M) which is  a-accessible  from f  where  q = max (28, 1/n).  This is true for all 
n >  n, and 8 is arbitrary.  Therefore, g  is accessible from f.  Q.E.D. 
4.  PROPERTIES  OF CYCLICALLY  STABLE  SETS 
In this section, we prove that CSS's exist. Also,  we will see  the relationship between 
Nash equilibrium on the one hand and cyclically stable set and socially stable strategy on 
the other. 
Existence 
Before we state and prove the existence theorem for CSS, we denote by R(f  ) the set 
of strategy profiles which are accessible from f,  i.e., given f E  Xi  E I  (S,), 
R(f)  =  {gE  x1E  XI(S,)Ig  is accessible  from f}. SOCIAL  STABILITY  AND  EQUILIBRIUM  865 
In the proof,  we make use of Zorn's  lemma  and the lemmata  presented  in the previous 
section. 
THEOREM:  Every  game  has at least  one cyclically  stable  set. 
PROOF:  First,  observe  that R(f ) is nonempty  for any  fE  EF; that,  by Lemma  1, R(f ) is 
closed for any f; and that, by Lemma  2, f' E R(f ) implies R(f') c R(f ). 
Next, we consider  the family  of sets {R(f )IflE Fand  define  the inclusion c  as a partial 
order  on them.  Take any  family  {f la  E A  of strategy  profiles  such that for any  a and ,B  in 
A,  either  R( f  ) c R(f  f)  or  R( f  ) D  R(f I)  holds.  Consider  nf  aE AR(f  ),  which  is 
nonempty  since the R( )'s are compact.  Choose any f  in  n  a E  AR(f)  and recall that 
R(f)  cR( fa )  holds for all  aE  E A.  Hence, R(f )  is  a  lower bound on  the  R( f a)s. 
Therefore,  by Zorn's lemma, there exists a minimal element R* = R(f*)  among the 
R( )'s. It is not empty  because all the sets R(f )'s are nonempty. 
We now claim that R(f *) is a CSS. Indeed, for any fE  R(f *) Lemma  2 implies  that 
R(f)cR(f*).  On the other hand, R(f)DR*  holds for any f  in  R* since R* is a 
minimal element. Thus, R(f)  = R* holds, which implies that every point in  R* is 
accessible  from any point in R*, and no point outside R* is accessible  from any point 
in R*.  Q.E.D. 
By a similar  argument,  we can prove that for any strategy  profile f,  there exists a 
cyclically  stable  set any  element  of which  is accessible  from f. That  is to say, the "domain 
of attraction"  of all the cyclically  stable  sets is the whole space of mixed  strategies  (where 
a point f  is said to be attracted  to a CSS F* if there exists  g E F* which is accessible 
from f; obviously,  f  may  be attracted  to several  CSS's.)  It is also worth  noting  that every 
CSS and its domain of attraction  are closed and connected, that it is invariant  with 
respect to sequential  elimination  of strictly  dominated  strategies  and redundant  strate- 
gies (for detail, see Gilboa  and Matsui  (1989)).  We also note here that CSS's  are neither 
upper  nor lower hemi continuous  with respect  to the game payoffs. 
Nash  Equilibrium  and Social  Stability 
We first  have the following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION:  Any socially  stable  strategy  is a Nash equilibrium. 
PROOF:  Suppose  that a strategy  profile  f  is not a Nash equilibrium.  Then there exist 
3 > 0 and s^  E Si for some i E I  such that any strategy  profile in U (f)  takes s^ with 
probability  of at least 6 and [1] 0  Br6(Uf(f)) holds. Then for any E > 0, there exists an 
e-accessible  path p which  reaches  the boundary  of Uj(f) since the speed of decrease  in 
pi(t)(s)  is positive  and bounded  away  from zero. Thus, there is a strategy  profile  in the 
boundary  of U(f  ) which  is accessible  from f  since the boundary  is sequentially  compact. 
Hence, f cannot  be a socially  stable  strategy.  Q.E.D. 
Next, we define a strict  Nash equilibrium  as a strategy  profile  f * such that Br(f *) = 
{f  *}, i.e., f * is a profile  of strategies  which are strictly  better responses  to f * than any 
other strategies.  Then any strict Nash equilibrium  is a socially  stable strategy  since for 
sufficiently  small E  > 0, the set of the best response  directions  consists  only of itself. Note 
that the converse  is not true in general.  In the game "matching  pennies,"  for example, 
the mixed  strategy  Nash equilibrium  is a socially  stable strategy;  on the other hand, it is 
not a strict Nash equilibrium  (recall that any mixed strategy  profile cannot be a strict 
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Type 1 
L  C  R 
L  2, 2  1.2,1.2  -  1,3 
Type 1  C  1.2,1.2  1,1  .2,.2 
R  3,  -1  .2,.2  0, 0 
FIGURE  2 
The concept  of cyclically  stable set is not directly  related  to that of Nash equilibrium. 
Though  socially  stable  strategy  is always  a Nash equilibrium,  each Nash equilibrium  may 
be in some CSS or outside any of the CSS's.  We proceed  to show an example  of a game 
which has no Nash equilibrium  inside any CSS. Consider one-type game with two 
individuals  matching  in Figure  2. This game  has a unique  Nash equilibrium,  (+[L] + '[C] 
+  1R],4  [L] + +[C]  +  [R]), if we regard  it as a two-person  game. In the following,  we 
let (p, q, r) stand for (p[L] + q[C] + r[R]). We will find a CSS and then show that it is 
accessible  from  the unique  Nash equilibrium,  which does not belong to it. This will also 
prove  that the Nash equilibrium  does not belong  to any  other CSS. Figures  3 and 4 show 
the simplex  of strategy  profiles.  In these figures,  the vertex L of the triangle  stands  for 
the strategy  profile [L] and so on. The line segment AD  indicates that if a strategy 
profile  is on this line, then the pure strategies  L and C yield the same expected  payoff  to 
the individuals.  Similarly,  on BE, individuals  are indifferent  between C and R, and on 
C'F-between  L and R. Therefore,  the area ACBC'N is the one in which  an individual 
prefers to take L; C'LDEN is for R; and ERFAN is for C. Finally, N  is the Nash 
equilibrium. 
In this game, a behavior  pattern which differs  from N  swirls around it indefinitely 
without reaching  any pure strategy  profile. In fact, one may find that if the behavior 
pattern  is inside PQR'  of Figure  3 (or 4), then it follows  an expanding  cycle converting  to 
PQR', and if it is outside PQR',  it follows one shrinking  to PQR',  where P = (.4,.5,.1), 
Q  = (.16,.2,.64), and Ri = (.04,.8,.16). If the behavior pattern is on  PQR', then an 
E-accessible  path remains  in some band around  PQR'  (see three triangular  movements  in 
Figure  4, in which  dotted lines show E-perturbation,  that is, between  dotted lines near P, 
for instance,  both (1,  0,  0) and (0,  0, 1) are best response  directions)  and the bank  shrinks 
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how small  E is,  PQR' is accessible  from  N,  there  is no  CSS  which contains  the  Nash 
equilibrium in this game. 
We do not view this phenomenon  as a flaw of the concept of CSS; rather, it seems to 
us as criticizing the Nash equilibrium concept. To the extent that one finds the dynamic 
process presented  above as reasonable, one is led to believe  that Nash equilibrium may 
not be  the appropriate tool for analysis of the evolution  of economic  behavior in large 
populations. 
JL Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 
Evanston, IL 60208, U.S.A. 
Manuscript  received  April, 1989;  final revision received  April, 1990. 
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